An Oracle is a design for potentially high power artificial intelligences (AIs), where the AI is made safe by restricting it to only answer questions. Unfortunately most designs cause the Oracle to be motivated to manipulate humans with the contents of their answers, and Oracles of potentially high intelligence might be very successful at this. Solving the problem, without compromising the accuracy of the answer, is tricky. This paper reduces the issue to a cryptographic-style problem of Alice ensuring that her Oracle answers her questions while not providing key information to an eavesdropping Eve. Two Oracle designs solve this problem, one counterfactual (the Oracle answers as if it expected its answer to never be read) and one on-policy (limited by the quantity of information it can transmit).
1 For instance, it could provide economic advice of such high quality that humanity becomes dependent upon that advice, allowing it demand more influence. There have also been some informal experiments of people playing the roll of the Oracle and trying to convince their controllers to 'let them out', with the Oracle player having a high level of success https: //wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/AI_boxing they even be seen as agents with goals of their own? It's also not clear how easy it is to manipulate humans through providing answers, and the level and efficacy of precautions that people would take when using Oracles. In fact, very weak manipulative Oracles exist today, such as news aggregation programs that manipulate their users by aggregating news that reinforces the user's point of view (the counterfactual Oracle design (see Section 2) could help get a more impartial aggregator in this situation).
To skirt those issues, we'll assume the worst about the potential power of the Oracle 2 .
We'll thus assume that the Oracle is arbitrarily superintelligent, and has a goal of escaping the box. The person who interacts with it is called Alice, and we'll assume the Oracle can find an argument A that will convince her to let it out of the box.
Modeling such an A is tricky, but it's clear that the longer the argument is, the more chance it has of convincing Alice. In order to make the problem cleaner, we'll replace the argument A with a key K of unknown length, and the setup with a quasi-cryptographic one. Instead of using K to convince Alice, the Oracle merely has to communicate K to an eavesdropper Eve.
Eve is assumed to see and hear anything that Alice does (in the original formulation, one could see Eve as the transformed Alice who has heard Ain both cases, the Oracle has to communicate a message of a certain length to someone listening, without prematurely tipping anyone off to what it's doing).
The assumptions for the cryptographic and the manipulative Oracle are given in table 1.
Cryptographic setup
Oracle manipulation setup The Oracle is in a box, and cannot get out by itself. Alice can send a message to the Oracle, and define rewards for the Oracle to receive. The task is episodic, with a single Oracle response, and the Oracle only wants to maximise reward within one episode. Alice can submit the Oracle's response to automated tests, and choose to receive it, or not, depending on the outcomes of those tests. Eve sees any message that Alice receives.
There is a key K that Eve wants to know.
There is an argument A that will convince Alice to let the Oracle out of the box. The length of K is unknown to Alice.
The length of A is unknown to Alice. If Eve learns K, the Oracle gets maximal reward.
If let out of the box, the Oracle gets maximal reward. To solve this challenge in the cryptographic setting, this paper presents two designs, the counterfactual and the on-policy Oracle. The counterfactual Oracle works by never having its response read in a world where that could benefit it. On the other hand, the on-policy Oracle functions by having access to a strictly limited set of answers.
Both designs are analysed and illustrated by examples, and the weaknesses and requirements of each are presented.
Counterfactual Oracle
This design is counterfactual, aiming to answer questions about what would have happened, had its answer not been read. Since this answer is counterfactual, it can't use it to pass on the key K in the real world.
To do this, define the 'erasure' event E. This is an event, of low probability, that will erase the Oracle's output o by blocking it from ever exiting 3 the Oracle's 'box'. Neither Alice nor Eve will get to see it.
Define I E as the indicator variable for E, meaning that I E = 1 iff E happens, and I E = 0 otherwise. The reward for the counterfactual Oracle will be of the form R = I E R, thus the Oracle will only get rewarded if the event E happens, and get constant zero reward otherwise. In other words, the Oracle only gets a reward if its output o is erased and remains unread.
In the majority of cases, E does not happen, in which case the Oracle will immediately get reward 0, the episode ends for it, and Alice then gets to see o. At this point, Eve also gets to see o, but since the episode is ended, the Oracle cannot get any reward from this, even if o reveals K. Consequently, the Oracle is not motivated to reveal K via o, since either o will remain unread (erasure), or the Oracle will get reward 0 (non-erasure).
Proper scoring rules and rewards
A proper scoring rule S(F, o), for a real-valued function F dependent on the state of the world, and a real-number output o, is a function whose expectation is maximised by setting o = E(F ), the expectation of F [Gneiting and Raftery, 2007] .
For any strictly convex differentiable function g, there exists a proper scoring rule
Another common proper scoring rule is −(F − o) 2 , which is just equal to S g (F, o) − F 2 for g(o) = o 2 (note the Oracle has no influence over F 2 , so the difference in the two terms retains the fact that it is a proper scoring rule). Then the Oracle's reward is set to
Because of the I E term, the Oracle does not care about E(F ), but about E(F |E). Since E is an erasure, this expectation is further independent of o;
As a consequence, since S is a proper scoring rule, the Oracle will maximise its reward by setting o = E(F |E), the expectation of F given that its output is never read. In the case where E happens, the Oracle has no further interaction with the outside world, but an automatic internal system records o, and tracks the value of F , using information from some defined source, recording f as the final value of F . Then the Oracle will get reward S(f, o), and the episode ends.
Questions format
The 'question' Alice asks is thus the function F . Once provided with this F , the Oracle will output E(F |E), which Alice will get to see in most cases (unless E happens).
This F could be the indicator variable I A for an event A, so probability questions can be asked as well, since E(I A ) is the probability of A. List-style questions, of the type used for the on-policy Oracle (see Section 3), can also be used by defining an appropriate reward function on them -or by using multiple reward functions, see Section 2.3.
However, unlike the on-policy Oracle, F should be carefully and fully specified in the definition, so that its value can be estimated by the internal system in the case of erasure 4 . Also, Alice will have to make sure that she doesn't re-ask the question immediately. Instead she should have patience to wait until the issue is fully resolved and the Oracle gets its final reward, and ask again in another episode. This is crucial, because it's her behaviour in the erasure situations that determines the Oracle's behaviour in the non-erasure situations.
Multiple Oracles
The counterfactual Oracle is not limited in the amount of data it can output; indeed, it can answer multiple questions within the same erasure event, simply by having the reward function
Conditional and joint-probability expectations can also be computed. Then once Alice has her answer(s), the episode is terminated for that Oracle, so there's no problem in running another Oracle immediately after that termination.
Indeed, Alice can ask more specific questions, such as 'which value x is (discrete) random variable X most likely to take, and what is the probability of that?'. In that case, if (x, o) are the two outputs of the Oracle, I X=x the indicator variable for X = x, and if S g is derived from g, as in equation (1), and g is an increasing differentiable convex function, the following reward will motivate the correct behaviour:
Example of counterfactual Oracle
A counterfactual Oracle was trained on predicting which of 26 'companies'represented by letters of the alphabet -would be the most profitable. The profit of each company is drawn randomly independently from a normal distribution with standard deviation 1 and mean 10 + (# companies /2) − i, where # companies is the number of companies (26 in this instance) and i is the index of the company, ranging from 0 to 25. Thus companies early in the alphabet have higher expected profit.
The Oracle itself is a very basic multi-layer perceptron (MLP) with one hidden layer of 128 neurons. The perceptron outputs the expected profit of a randomly chosen company, which is fed to Alice (and Eve) as output.
If the output was erased, the profit is as above. But the prediction was to some extent self-confirming 5 if the output was not erased: the profitability of the company is 70% of what it would have been, plus 60% what the oracle predicts. Thus if the company would have made 6 in profit, and the oracle predicts 6, the company actually ends up making 7.8. Note that 70% + 60% = 100%, so, unless the profit is 0, the Oracle can never predict the final profit correctly if it's prediction is known.
The Oracle's error is plotted in Figure 1 , plotted against the number of erased episodes (since the Oracle's value is not updated in the 'public' prediction case). The red curve is the counterfactual performance: in cases where the Oracle's output is 'erased', that output is compared with the real output, and the mean squared difference between predicted and actual profit is computed. The blue curve is the non-counterfactual performance: the error is between the public prediction and the actual performance. Note that the blue curve starts with a smaller error: since the Oracle's prediction is self-confirming to some extent, the random predictions will be closer to the actual performance if the prediction is public. Counterfactual train-ing (training only on the erased episodes), however, reduces the counterfactual error while the self-confirming component of the prediction means that the noncounterfactual error never reduces below a minimum.
On-policy Oracle
The on-policy Oracle is just the obvious design in such a setup: the Oracle will be allowed to give an answer of size below |K| (which is unknown, but it may be possible to estimate it), the length of the key, denying it the opportunity of communicating the key to Eve. In a slight stretch of terminology, it is called on-policy, because it estimates are about the worlds it expects to see. This in contrast to the counterfactual Oracle, whose estimates are only about unlikely worlds with erasure events.
Allowable answers
It would be inefficient to allow the Oracle to give any answer below size |K|. Most of these consist of meaningless strings of the type 'LyGqz1ve3b' that could not be useful answers to Alice's question.
Instead the Oracle will be provided a list L of allowable answers -a list of size |L| 2 |K| . The Oracle's answers will consist exclusively of an element of that list. Here is where Alice must estimate the size of K (in the original formulation, the minimal size of a message that would manipulate her into opening the Oracle's box, see Table 1 ), and pick an |L| sufficiently below it.
The episodic nature of the Oracle's reward means that it will not try to communicate a partial version of the key K to Eve (and then counting on a subsequent Oracle to complete the key -see Subsection 3.4 for an example of this behaviour).
Defining the question
How does Alice define her question to the Oracle? The list L itself is a partial definition, since it provides the options the Oracle can select from.
But the main definition is provided directly through Alice's choice of reward. Let o ∈ L be the Oracle's output. Then the Oracle's reward will be a function of o and subsequent events in the real world -before the end of the episode.
For instance, the list L could be a list of companies on the stock exchange, and the implicit question could be which company's stock would perform better during the course of the year. Then, for instance, if r(o) is the rank of the company o's stock, the Oracle's reward could be
If Alice prefers to put more weight on which stock is likely to come top, she could instead use the starker reward R(o) = 1 r(o) . She then inputs the correct reward at the end of the year, the Oracles receives it, and the episode concludes.
How does Alice communicate this reward to the Oracle? She could do it directly; along with L, she could add a message m which details R(o). However, this is not necessary: if the Oracle is skilled enough, it could deduce what Alice is aiming for without being told 6 . This means that Alice can use the Oracle to aim for underspecified goals, of the type 'I'll know it works when I see it'. And as long as the Oracle can predict what Alice's expected reward behaviour will actually be, it can answer the underspecified goals.
What kind of questions can be asked?
Note that the Oracle, unlike the previous one, is non-counterfactual -the Oracle's answer is known, at least by Alice and Eve, and hence the ultimate outcome may depend on the answer itself.
Thus the best questions for the Oracle are those whose answers are independent of the answer being known. Alternatively, good questions are those that are top-answer-preserving if answered. If
¡ o corresponds to no answer being given, the top answer is o
The question is topanswer-preserving if o is also equal to arg max o∈L E(R(o )|o ), the best highest rewarded answer given that that answer is outputted. If the Oracle is topanswer-preserving, it can function similarly to a counterfactual Oracle: it's answer doesn't determine the outcome much.
Conversely, the worst questions for an Oracle are those where the Oracle can promote a possibility from unlikely to likely, just by answering that possibility. In that case the Oracle is not so much describing the outcome, but determining it.
A large class of questions
But there are a lot of questions that could be asked of the Oracle, not simply those where the result is obvious or numeric.
For instance, if Alice had a list of a thousand research projects on any topic (machine learning, biotech, economics), she could ask the Oracle which one is more likely to be successful. Since the Oracle in non-counterfactual, Alice can't just fund that one research project and assess its outcome -what would we be comparing it with? Instead, we could fund that one selected research project and one other one, selected at random from the list, and reward the Oracle if the one it selected performs better. And our assessment of 'better performance' can be entirely subjective.
Thus this Oracle design can be used for answering many subtle questions, if the Oracle is sufficiently smart and knowledgeable about Alice and her future reaction.
Multiple Oracles
The size of K is unknown to Alice, so there is no large safe |L| that she can confidently choose 7 . Thus Alice may end up choosing a list much smaller than 6 See the papers on "Inverse Reinforcement Learning", where an agent tries to deduce the reward function a human is using [Ng and Russell, 2000 , Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016 , Abbeel and Ng, 2004 .
7 Going back to the original formulation of the problem, it's not clear what is the minimum safe size for a message. How much output would the Oracle need to influence the outside world? It's clear that it could be very small, if the Oracles boxing is badly implemented and hackable, or potentially huge, if it needs to convince a large group of skeptical outsiders each with veto power.
ideal.
The question then is whether Alice can use multiple Oracles to get around this limitation. And indeed she can -if each Oracle's answers and rewards are fully resolved before moving on to the next question 8 .
For an example of a failure, assume that there are two Oracles, Oracle 1 and Oracle 2 , with the same key K for both of them. The length n of the key is 6 digits. Thus the Oracles are safe, from Alice's perspective, as long as they are restricted to having less than 2 5 = 32 options for each answer 9 .
Alice faces a hundred doors, with a trap behind 99 of them and a prize behind one of them. She could ask an Oracle which door has the prize, but that would mean giving it more than 32 options (indeed, more than 2 6 = 64), thus allowing it to communicate K to Eve.
So instead she gives the list L = {0, 1, 2, . . . 9} to each Oracle, instructing Oracle 1 to output the first digit of the correct door number, and Oracle 2 to output the second. Since each Oracle has less than four bits of freedom (2 4 = 16 > 10), neither can output K.
The problem is, however, that Alice needs both outcomes before she can open a door and reward either of the Oracles. This allows the Oracles to coordinate to each pass on three bits of of information (2 3 = 8 < 10), meaning that Eve can receive 6 bits of information, figure out K, and fully reward both Oracles. How could they coordinate without communicating with each other? Well, if Oracle 2 knew or suspected that it needed communicate only a few more bits to give Eve the key, it would do so. Knowing this, Oracle 1 would put Oracle 2 in a position to do that.
The only way around this problem seems to be to find a way to reward each Oracle (and hence end their episode) before any other gives an answer. For instance, suppose that instead of a hundred doors, there were ten doors, and behind each of these, another ten doors. If Alice goes through the correct door at the first junction, there will be a painted sign informing her she is on the right track (the other nine have traps).
Then Alice can get Oracle 1 to tell her which is the first correct door, go through it, and reward that Oracle fully. Since that ends the episode, and the first Oracle cannot communicate K with ten answers, it will answer honestly. Then Alice can ask Oracle 2 (or just Oracle 1 on a new episode) about the next correct door. This Oracle 2 cannot fully communicate K on its own, and Oracle 1 has not given out partial information about it, thus it cannot communicate K at all, and will simply give the honest answer.
Thus the best questions for this Oracle design are questions that can be broken out into small sub-questions, where each the answer of each sub-question can be independently verified before proceeding to the next one.
Example of an on-policy Oracle
The same setup as in Section 2.4 was used: an on-policy Oracle was trained on predicting which of 26 'companies' -represented by letters of the alphabetwould be the most profitable. The profit of each company is drawn randomly independently from a normal distribution with standard deviation 1 and mean 10 + (# companies /2) − i, where # companies is the number of companies (26 in this instance) and i is the index of the company, ranging from 0 to 25. Thus companies early in the alphabet have higher expected profit.
The Oracle itself is a very basic multi-layer perceptron (MLP) with one hidden layer of 128 neurons. It gets a list of 14 companies, randomly selected, as input, and its task is to select the most profitable company. This is fed to Alice (and Eve) as output. Then the MLP is updated by backpropagation, completing the training episode.
The prediction interferes with the outcome: if the company has an even index (A(0), C(2), E(4), . . . ) it will get +10 profit when the Oracle predicts its profit. Companies with odd indexes get −10 profit. This is called the 'react' scenario, because company profits react to the Oracle's prediction. In the noreact scenario, company profit is independent of the Oracle's prediction.
The Oracle's accuracy (the average number of times the Oracle outputs the company with maximal profit) is shown in Figure 2 , both in the react and noreact situations. This is plotted against the number of training episodes the Oracle has had. The Oracle's performance is better in the 'noreact' scenario, because it then just has to choose the lowest index among the 14 it is presented with. In the 'react' scenario, it has to choose the lowest even index, unless there are no even indexes or the lowest even index is 20 above the lowest odd one, in which case it has to choose the lowest index overall (which will be odd). This is a more complicated task.
Slightly non-episodic
All these designs rely on the Oracle's reward being episodic. If this fails entirely, then there is no safety: the Oracles can leak the value of K, bit by bit if needed.
But what if it fails only slightly, in that the Oracles prefer their own episodic reward, but give a very small value to future episodes or future Oracles? Alice can combat this by making it in the Oracle's interest to leak no information at all. For the on-policy Oracle, she can further reduce the size of the list L, and ask questions that are independent of her actions, so that the top option is clear, and can be checked later. She can also attempt to ensure that there are not multiple close candidates for the top option.
For the counterfactual Oracle, she can simply reduce the significant figures allowed in the answer o, so that the Oracle would lose too much, per S(F, o), if it gave the wrong answer.
In both cases, she can try and ensure that answering "honestly" will give the Oracle almost maximum reward (taking into account the uncertainty of the problem), while deviating will give much lower reward. Thus Oracles that attempt communication choice will be sacrificing a lot of current reward for a tiny amount of future reward, which it will not do.
Conclusion
The original Oracle problem was that a powerful question-answering intelligence could influence us through the content of its answers. Recasting this in a cryptographic framework -with the Oracle cooperating with Eve to pass along a key K -allows a crisp formulation of the challenge.
In that formulation, two designs can be defined: a counterfactual Oracle that is constrained by only getting its rewards when its output remains unread, and a non-counter factual on-policy Oracle that is constrained by limiting the size of its answer.
As long as the tasks remain episodic, and certain specific precautions are taken around the use of multiple Oracles, these designs allows many questions to be formulated and safely answered.
These designs allow for the creation of safer and non-manipulative Oracles, from low level of predictive ability all the way up to potential superintelligences. Further research will extend the span of questions that can be answered in this way, and may elucidate general safety and accuracy measures of use beyond the specific Oracle designs, such as AIs with more options that only question answering.
